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Abstract 
 
Taxes on tobacco provide a significant income for the Australian government – $5.1 billion 
in 2001. At the same time, health officials are making strenuous efforts to reduce smoking, 
particularly among teenagers. Some economists suggest that raising taxes on tobacco will 
produce more revenue while at the same time lowering smoking rates, particularly among 
youths who have less discretionary spending power than adults. But a by-product of excise 
tax in Australia has been the emerging market in ‘chop-chop,’ tobacco diverted from legal 
channels by growers who receive considerably higher prices for a part of their yield than 
they can obtain from legal manufacturers. The article details this situation and suggests that 
only bold solutions may be able to reduce tensions in tax policies, smoking rates and the 
‘chop-chop’ black market.  
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Public wealth, public health, and private stealth: Australia’s black market in cigarettes 
Gilbert Geis1, Sophie Cartwright and Jodie Houston 
 
Introduction 
 
Australia’s tobacco industry in worldwide terms is extremely small – some two tenths of 
one per cent of the globe’s total tobacco production – in a market dominated by China, 
Brazil, India and the United States. Australia today has about 300 licensed tobacco 
growers, a number that has been shrinking steadily. In contrast, countries such as Brazil 
and Canada, comparable in size to Australia, report in the vicinity of 30 000 tobacco 
growers each. The specific dynamics of the Australian tobacco industry provides an 
interesting and well defined context in which to understand the interaction of regulation, 
collection of tax revenue and the rise of the illicit tobacco trade. In the first section of the 
paper we briefly outline the regulatory changes that have taken place, particularly over the 
last decade. We then examine the current arrangements for the regions that farm tobacco in 
Australia, documenting the concerns growers have for the future of tobacco in Australia 
and the offhand treatment of farmers who feel caught at the mercy of the manufacturers 
and the government. Finally, this article considers the rise of the illicit tobacco market and 
examines the temptations and the problems illegal tobacco is causing.  
 
The current arrangement for the control and taxation of tobacco in Australia is a relatively 
recent development so that as yet there are few tested tactics for dealing effectively with 
the emergent black market. Tobacco has been grown in Australia since the establishment 
of the penal colony (Walker, 1984; Winstanley, Woodward & Walker, 1995). Cigarettes 
first were manufactured in 1887 and became preferred over pipes and cigars. The tobacco 
industry prospered as the twentieth century unfolded, with an all time high of 1317 
growers before the Great Depression of the 1930s. Regulation largely was left to the 
industry itself, though in 1936 the Local Leaf Content Scheme mandated Commonwealth 
support for growers. By 1997, this subsidy program decreed that manufacturers include   
                                                 
1 Professor Emeritus, Department of Criminology, Law and Society, University of California, Irvine. He is a former 
president of the American Society of Criminology and recipient of its Edwin H. Sutherland award for outstanding 
research. 
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50 per cent of domestic product in their cigarettes. On their own, the manufacturers raised 
this figure to 57 per cent. 
 
Tobacco was taxed by the states and the territories by means of business franchise fees. In 
August 1997, however, the High Court in Ha v. New South Wales ruled by a 4-3 margin 
that such fees were an excise duty and that under Section 50 of the Constitution the 
Commonwealth is granted the exclusive power to collect excise taxes. The court decision 
noted ‘the size of the business fee clearly exceeded the cost of implementation’ (Ha and 
Another v. New South Wales, 1997, p. 471). Had one judge in the majority joined the 
dissenters, arrangements for the tobacco trade in Australia would have remained under the 
control of the states. Instead, oversight became a federal responsibility. 
 
Before the Ha decision, state governments had provided funds to restructure the tobacco 
industry. In 1994, for instance, Victoria allocated $3 million for growers who voluntarily 
agreed to leave the industry, and in the same year the entire New South Wales tobacco 
growing enterprise was dismantled by a similar approach. This development occurred in 
concert with the abolition of the tariff on imported leaf (Australian Taxation Office 2002a, 
p. 7).  
 
There always has been a certain low level of tax-evasive dealing in cigarettes. When state 
franchises were in force, this tended to involve cross-border forays of shoppers who legally 
stocked up on cigarettes that cost less in the countries or states they were visiting than at 
home, and there were smugglers who did the same thing, dealing in much larger amounts 
(see van Fossen, 2002, p. 223 for an illustration of smuggling via Norfolk Island). During 
the Second World War, an extensive black market came into existence when cigarette 
supplies were severely limited (Thompson, 2002). 
 
Tobacco growing today 
 
The Australian practice of licensing growers is believed to exist nowhere else in the world. 
The exceedingly small number of growers (about 300) makes this approach feasible; 
Australia produces only about two-tenths of one per cent of the world’s tobacco. In 
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countries such as Brazil and Canada, which are not much different in size from Australia, 
there are about 30 000 tobacco farmers. 
 
From the viewpoint of those licensed tobacco growers at work in Australia today, the 
country’s domestic industry is in dire financial straits, a judgment not sensibly open to 
dispute. The growers are now almost exclusively congregated in two sites – Mareeba and 
the neighbouring Dimbula and Muchiba regions in Northern Queensland and Myrtleford, 
including the surrounding valleys in North-east Victoria. The growers’ plight is the result 
of an ever-decreasing interest in the purchase of their crop by Philip Morris and the British 
American Tobacco Australia (BAT), the country’s two major cigarette manufacturers. 
Table 1 indicates the dramatic dip in the demand for North Queensland tobacco. In 2002, 
BAT withdrew from the North Queensland market, a move dictated in large measure by 
economic factors. In 2002, when BAT purchased 12 000 bales in North Queensland and 
Philip Morris bought 10 000, this constituted only about fifty per cent of what growers 
customarily had and could produce. For one thing, Myrtleford possesses the only threshing 
machine2 in Australia. This facility moved there from Melbourne in 1995, adding 
significantly to the transportation costs for Queensland-grown tobacco, or, as those in the 
trade put it, imposing ‘a tyranny of distance.’ 
                                                 
2 It is here that the stem is separated from the lamina of the tobacco leaf and the lamina is dried to an even 
moisture content that seeks to provide optimum ageing conditions during the storage period. The acquisition 
of the threshing plant from Philip Morris was a striking coup for the Myrtleford area growers. 
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Table 1: Bales of tobacco purchases by manufacturers in North Queensland 
 
Year Number of Bales Year Number of Bales 
1983 68 639 1994 59 136 
1984 65 006 1995 N/A 
1985 65 002 1996 85 212 
1986 66 328 1997 50 542 
1987 68 585 1998 45 421 
1988 69 929 1999 32 950 
1989 69 537 2000 27 736 
1990 70 045 2001 31 128 
1991 72 201 2002 22 000 
1992 72 931 2003 est. 10 000 
1993 69 031 - - 
Source: Stadhans & Gibbs (2002) 
 
Both BAT and Philip Morris indicated that they have not altogether given up on 
domestically-produced Australian tobacco, largely because the country has a relatively 
stable economy and political structure. Otherwise, they long since would have moved to 
sites such as Indonesia, where labour is much cheaper. Last year, illustratively, BAT 
opened a processing plant in China, a country with 310 million smokers who consume one-
third of the world’s cigarette production. But Indonesia, as we have seen, has been targeted 
by terrorists, and China only recently signed a treaty that allowed inroads to be made into 
the government’s monopoly grip on the nation’s cigarette industry, an industry that 
provides ten per cent of the country’s tax revenues. 
 
The current situation has taken a considerable emotional and financial toll on Australian 
tobacco growers, many of whom are second and third-generation descendants of immigrant 
families – primarily Italians and Albanians – that cultivated tobacco when the crop first 
became prominent in Australia in the 1850s. Some tobacco growers have tried to break 
their economic fall by turning to other crops, or beginning supplementary agricultural 
pursuits, but they have had a notable lack of success with such endeavours. In Northern 
Queensland, mangoes and avocados and lychees quickly ran up against an oversupplied 
market. The tea tree oil business prospered briefly with the product advertised to deal with 
sensitive skin conditions, but in the end left North Queensland farmers with storage tanks 
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full of a product whose price dropped dramatically because of over-supply. This occurred – 
after tax shelter promoters signed up some 40 000 customers in tax avoidance schemes 
(including tea tree investments). 
 
Despite the growers’ misfortunes, the Australian health authorities undoubtedly are not 
unhappy about what appears to be strong signs of the demise of domestic tobacco 
cultivation. The thoroughly-documented health ravages produced by cigarette smoking 
could be further attacked, even if only symbolically, by a program eliminating the 
domestic growing of tobacco and only reluctantly, in the name of freedom of choice and 
free trade, allowing cigarettes to be imported into Australia. 
 
There are other matters that bear upon the future of Australian tobacco. For one thing, the 
Australian government in 2001 took in $5.1 billion in revenue from taxes imposed on the 
tobacco. The seventy per cent tax impost in Australia accords with the rate in place 
throughout most of the world. European Union legislation requires that cigarette taxes be at 
least seventy per cent (Merriman, no date, p. 34).  
 
The cigarette tax impacts most heavily on lower income people, and it can consume a 
significant portion of their living expenses. This matter seems worth more attentive 
political consideration. Cnossen (1977, p. 47) points out, following a survey of excise taxes 
throughout the world, that ‘it appears that the tobacco excise is repressive almost 
everywhere.’ But the same author notes that this situation could be remedied if lower-grade 
cigarettes were produced and consumer prices were adjusted to accord to the nature of the 
product. In Indonesia, for instance, a lower rate is (or at that time was) imposed on 
indigenous black tobacco and clove primarily used by lower-income workers. In India, biri 
cigarettes are taxed at a much lower rate than American imports, and in the Philippines the 
excise rate for a pack of cheaper cigarettes was about one-third that for the expensive 
imports (Cnossen, 1977, p. 50). Of course, selectively reducing taxes to make some 
cigarettes more affordable conflicts with policies that seek to reduce smoking, a practice 
disproportionately found in persons with lower incomes. But nonetheless such policies 
seem preferable because they are fair and not favourable to the haves at the expense of the 
have-nots.  
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The Australian practice of licensing growers is believed to exist nowhere else in the world. 
Australian growers sell their tobacco crop to the two manufacturers: recent prices were 
about $600 a bale; the average grower produces about 400 bales a year. The manufacturer 
is then taxed $26 000 for each bale it buys. On top of that there is a ten per cent Goods and 
Services impost. It does not take a mathematical Nobelist to appreciate that the gap 
between what the grower receives for tobacco and what the government realises is 
stunningly large. The numbers are these: A grower gets about $7 for a kilo of tobacco; the 
tax authorities harvest $287 for each kilo. Were the tax to be evaded and the product sold 
directly to consumers, the growers’ profit would increase dramatically. Growers 
themselves, as far as we know, have not taken this illegal path, but middlemen have 
emerged to purchase tobacco bales for the illicit market. There is a great deal of talk 
evidence regarding the involvement of mafia-type groups in the chop-chop trade 
(Australian Taxation Office, 2002b, pp. 4, 15; Baxter & Wilson, 2001, pp. 45, 49, 52), but 
David Gray (2002), the director of intelligence at the National Crime Authority (now 
Australian Crime Commission), told us that his agency’s investigation of the chop-chop 
market concluded that it was not a sophisticated operation and that it ‘didn’t seem to meet 
the threshold level to justify National Crime Authority involvement.’ That does not 
necessarily mean, Gray added, that there might not be some kind of organised crime 
activity in the chop-chop business.  
 
Chop-chop middlemen pay about $3000 to $4000 for a bale of tobacco. Pressures have 
been increasing for growers to deal with chop-chop purchasers because of the diminishing 
legal outlet for their product, particularly in North Queensland where growers are 
experiencing a serious decline in their income standard. They commonly describe their 
situation as ‘desperate’ and getting worse. ‘To encourage your children to take over the 
farm and grow tobacco,’ said one farmer wryly, ‘would be a form of child abuse.’ Another, 
asked about his view of the future, said that he felt as if he were ‘behind a dog’s balls.’ We 
remain uncertain exactly what he meant, but understand that it was not a desirable location. 
Chop-chop underground transactions impact on the morale of honest growers. They are 
well aware of most of the transgressors, but they also are strongly united in upholding a 
code that insists that one not dob on those who choose a different solution to a common 
problem.  
 7
Danny Latit 
 
The growers’ plight was well expressed by Danny Latit, who works a tobacco farm with 
his brother Shahan. Danny sees the future as ‘scary’. ‘They ought to shut the industry 
down,’ he says, ‘and that would get rid of the chop-chop. Anybody growing tobacco would 
be doing it illegally’. He has no argument with diverse proposals to revive--perhaps 
resurrect is a better word--the tobacco industry, but he believes that they are utopian 
dreams. ‘They’re slowly choking the growers.’ By ‘they’ he means the manufacturers and 
the government.  
 
‘We’ve lived an honest, decent life,’ Danny says, ‘and the chop-chop buyers roll up and 
offer us $4000 for a bale that we can sell legally for only $660’. He says that sometimes 
the chop-chop merchants now call from public pay phones. He tells them all the same 
thing: ‘For you, the risk is small. You probably won’t get caught and if you do, the penalty 
will be light. For me it means the revocation of my license to grow tobacco and the end of 
the main source of my livelihood.’ 
 
Danny is a trained mechanic, but the farm is where he wants to be, though he appreciates 
that he probably is in a no-win situation. Growers, even as members of co-operatives, are 
so few in number that they possess no political clout, and no sensible politician is going to 
publicly support a product as tainted as tobacco. ‘Marijuana growers are better off than we 
are under the law,’ Danny says. He also repeats a theme that is virtually a creed today 
among Queensland growers. ‘Chop-chop used to be sold out of greed; now it has become a 
matter of need.’ Young tobacco producing families are said to be saddled with large 
mortgages and growing families that they cannot support under current marketing 
conditions. Nor will the banks make loans for repairs or new equipment when the future of 
the industry is in doubt. ‘I’m not doing anything illegal,’ Danny says, ‘yet I am made to 
feel that I am doing something dirty.’ Another grower put the point more forcefully: ‘They 
make me feel like a murderer,’ he said. 
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Remzi Mulla 
 
Remzi Mulla, white-haired, gregarious, articulate, and deeply devoted to the cause of 
tobacco growers in North Queensland, speaks for the beleaguered growers as head of the 
local co-operative. 
 
Remzi’s father came to Australia from Albania in 1927, on his own at the age of nineteen. 
He had left Europe for political and economic reasons. Twelve years later, he brought his 
wife and son to Australia. Remzi studied pharmacy, but in 1960, spurred by government 
subsidies, he and his brother started to cultivate tobacco – and for some time prospered. He 
believes that there remains hope for tobacco growing today if the following steps are taken: 
 
(1) Let the manufacturers defer their tax payments, now required weekly, to a 
monthly basis, which would allow them to pay higher prices to growers;  
(2) Eliminate the twice-a-year increases of the excise tax for tobacco that are based 
on the Consumer Price Index; 
(3) Beef up the enforcement effort to make chop-chop dealing truly dangerous for 
those who engage in it; and  
(4) Require buyers to purchase 40 000 bales of tobacco from North Queensland 
growers. 
 
Remzi in his interview with us then veered off to a threat that if growers do not get a better 
deal they will unite and not pay their rates. We suggested that such a revolt seemed 
unlikely to lead to constructive results. He shrugged: ‘We just can’t lie down,’ he said.  
 
Another option that Remzi is pushing is a buy-out by the government of the tobacco 
growers or at least those who can no longer sell sufficient product to sustain themselves. In 
2000, the North Queensland growers, in collaboration with those in Victoria, thought that 
they had the outline of a successful buy-out package. But Victorian growers withdrew from 
the coalition when their own growing future became more assured. What is needed today 
for North Queensland, Remzi says, is an ‘agri-politician,’ someone who will fight for 
North Queensland’s tobacco growers.  
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Chop-chop 
 
The term ‘chop-chop’ apparently came into use when Chinese immigrants, escaping from 
bleak mining jobs, briefly came to dominate the tobacco fields in the mid-nineteenth 
century before they were driven from the growing areas by prejudice that fuelled violent 
mob actions against them. Chop-chop tobacco typically is a roll-your-own smoke (or a 
‘rollie’ in light-hearted linguistic Australian) and is sold throughout the country in petrol 
stations, convenience stores, over the Internet, and at many other outlets. It is usually 
merchandised in plastic bags, though it can sometimes be marketed in packages of tailor-
made cigarettes. It generally is sold in bulk size of half-kilogram or one kilogram weight. 
Purchasers often presume that chop-chop is ‘purer’ than what they regard as adulterated 
and hazardous legal cigarettes, but what they neglect to consider is that what they buy is a 
product of particularly uncertain quality and composition.  
 
The amount of revenue lost because of the chop-chop market has been rather 
promiscuously guesstimated by a number of sources. The figures offered range between 
$90 million and $600 million annually: manufacturers’ estimates tend toward the higher 
amounts.  
 
Only a few surveys have made a stab at the number of persons who use chop-chop. The 
Department of Housing and Ageing, focusing on respondents who were twenty or older, 
places the Australian smoking population at twenty per cent of that age cohort. One and 
one half per cent of the regular smokers (defined as those who have at least one cigarette a 
week) said that they used chop-chop daily. This comes to about 20 persons out of 1500 
adult smokers. Only 0.4 per cent reported using chop-chop some days, while eight per cent 
said that chop-chop crosses their lips ‘only occasionally’ (Scollo, Freeman, Icasino & 
Wakefield, in press). 
 
A national survey of almost 27 000 persons 14 years and older found 19 per cent 
responding yes to the somewhat ambiguous question: ‘Have you ever come across 
unbranded loose tobacco (also called chop-chop) sold in plain bags or rolled in unbranded 
cigarettes?’ Within this group, 41 per cent responded affirmatively to the question: ‘Have 
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you ever smoked it?’ We do not learn how often they have done so. Young persons       
(age 14-19) reported smoking chop-chop less than their elders (29 per cent compared to 71 
per cent) and males more than females (47 per cent to 33 per cent) (Australian Institute of 
Health & Welfare, 2002). 
 
In terms of street prices, chop-chop retailed in 2001 for $45 to $60 a kilogram, while more 
recent reports escalate that figure to $80 to $100 for each kilogram. This compares to $320 
a kilogram for legal roll-your-own tobacco. The chop-chop price rise may indicate a lesser 
availability of the product, though it could reflect a rising demand or a greater risk of 
selling it.  
 
Various tactics suggest themselves to try to combat the chop-chop trade. The Taxation 
Office has inaugurated a Global Positioning System that seeks to measure the amount of 
growing area and thereby to calculate the output that any given farmer can expect to 
harvest. Subtractions are made for likely losses during cultivation, but the approach has 
flaws. Most notably, growers can plant tobacco seeds closer together and beat the 
government’s estimate of their yield. 
 
Beyond that, an increase in field investigators very likely would make an indent in the 
chop-chop business. So too would a system of rewards for information on illegal 
transactions as well as sting operations that attempt to buy part of a grower’s crop for the 
chop-chop market. Both a policy of rewards for information on illicit dealings and sting 
operations should make those involved or contemplating being involved in black market 
transactions a good deal more wary. Random roadblocks after tobacco has been harvested 
also ought to snare some trucks and vans transporting tobacco diverted from legal 
channels.  
 
Criminalising chop-chop use 
 
The best approach to this topic may be by way of posing a hypothetical. Suppose that we 
had the scientific information that we now possess in regard to the consequences of 
personal use of various drugs, such as opiates, alcohol, marijuana, and cigarettes. Suppose 
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too that we had no laws whatsoever on the books concerning the sale or possession of these 
items. And suppose, finally, that you are in a position to enact legislation on these matters. 
What would be the nature of the laws that you would favour? All matters considered, 
should a criminal penalty – presumably a relatively benign one, if any criminal penalty can 
be regarded as benign – be mandated for the use of any of these drugs, including cigarettes 
and chop-chop? 
 
Historically, there have been times and places where any trade in tobacco was outlawed. In 
1652, the English parliament prohibited the growing of tobacco. It empowered anyone to 
‘grub, cut up, destroy, and utterly consume such tobaccos.’ In some eastern countries at 
this time torture and death was the fate of cigarette smokers (Corina, 1975, pp. 38-39). 
There also have been times and places when the smoking of tobacco was virtually made 
mandatory. Tobacco was used by the Mayans for religious festivals as early as the first 
century. Jean Nicot, immortalised in the term ‘nicotine’, brought tobacco to France in 1556 
from his post as ambassador to Portugal; physicians used it for medicinal purposes 
(Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000, pp. 394-395). In 1665, students at Eton were required to 
smoke daily to protect themselves against the great plague, ‘under penalty of a 
housemaster’s whip for non-compliance’ (Corina, 1975, p. 49). 
 
There are few persuasive arguments regarding free traffic in the opiates; better ones 
perhaps could support legal cocaine; while the pros and cons concerning legally-available 
alcoholic beverages often seem to turn not on the issue of harm but on questions of the 
social and political feasibility of a prohibitive policy.  
 
How about marijuana and cigarettes and chop-chop? The options are to criminalise or, 
conversely, to make legal all three or any one or two of the trio. There appears to be no 
dispute that cigarette smoking is more dangerous to health than marijuana (Mack & Joy, 
2001; Zimmer, Morgan & Nadelmann, 1997). Nonetheless, whether a political entity ought 
to interdict self-destructive behaviour is not a question with an unquestionable answer. For 
some, such actions, to use a phrase highlighted in the Wolfenden Report (Great Britain, 
1957) on homosexuality and prostitution, are ‘not the law’s business’. For others, it is 
apparent that no adequate society would allow the marketing of foods that make people 
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seriously ill or products that are too easily flammable; therefore, it is argued, any product 
whose ill effects outweigh benefits ought to be banned. 
 
A difficulty is that a governing principle that might justify banning both cigarette smoking 
and marijuana use is not readily generalisable. If the aim is to reduce behaviours that are 
obviously and importantly related to poor health outcomes then dealing similarly with 
many other matters, such as overeating, offers a significant challenge. Do we concentrate 
on behaviours that seem easier to contend with or does the extent of the harm dictate our 
response? These are complicated issues that are key to public policy in regard to cigarettes 
and the chop-chop market. They rarely are addressed head-on, if at all.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the halcyon days of the Australian tobacco industry, political office holders routinely 
appeared at the auctions and market festivities in the growing areas, proud to associate 
with an important source of income and employment in their constituency. Today, tobacco 
growing is a tainted enterprise, and its practitioners have been left unattended, their fate at 
the mercy of the harsh realities of an unsympathetic marketplace. Our strong 
recommendation would be that the government buy out the remaining growers with a 
subsidy that would decently allow them to abandon the cultivation of tobacco and to 
bankroll entry into a different enterprise.  
 
This should eliminate the chop-chop market derived from domestically-produced leaf. It 
would return enforcement to Customs where the focus would be on the smuggling of 
untaxed tobacco. The wisdom of those who have studied the struggle against smuggling is 
that it is manageable if adequate resources are committed to combating it. They maintain 
that empirical research has shown, contrary to what commonsense might assume, that 
cigarette smuggling is most prevalent in countries with low excise tax, and they offer the 
advice that raising excise taxes (no ceiling is stipulated) will not only generate additional 
government income but also reduce smoking rates (Merriman, Yrelki & Chaloupka, 2000, 
p. 365; Joosens & Raw, 2000). Spain is often used as an example: it is said that although 
cigarettes in Spain were almost the cheapest for any European Union country, smuggled 
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cigarettes accounted for fifteen per cent of the market. But enforcement pressures reduced 
that rate to five per cent in half a dozen years. This and other case studies have led the 
World Bank to conclude: ‘Smuggling is a serious problem, but even where it occurs at high 
rates, tax increases bring greater revenues and reduce [cigarette] consumption. Therefore, 
rather than forgoing tax increases, the appropriate response to smuggling is to crack down 
on criminal activity’ (Action on Smoking and Health, 2000, p. 18). The reduction in 
smoking is said to be most pronounced among younger persons (Chaloupka, Tei-Wei Hu, 
Warner & Ayda, 2000, p. 237), though there is some dispute about this view (Wasserman, 
Manning, Newhouse & Winkler, 1991, pp. 60-61). 
 
We do not want to leave the World Bank conclusion unchallenged. It seems to us fairly 
obvious that if there is very little money to be made from smuggling rather fewer people 
would attempt it, and that, all other things being equal, the greater the profit the stronger 
the appeal. Second, the win-win position of the World Bank and other economists fails to 
factor in the costs of more effective enforcement, which may outweigh the advantage of a 
higher excise tax rate. As Flexner (1996, p. 1) has noted: 
 
The compact, lightweight nature of cigarettes makes it an ideal product for both 
cross-border purchases and large-scale interstate smuggling. Thus the disincentive 
to consume tobacco products posed by higher taxes can be largely mitigated by 
changes in purchasing patterns. The incentive to engage [in smuggling] clearly 
increases as the tax differentials between states rise. 
 
A case in point occurred in England in 1856, when a drafting error inadvertently cut the 
tobacco tariff by one-quarter. This reduced smuggling to such an extent that the revenue 
from the tobacco tax actually increased (Bartlett, 1994, p. 2). 
 
Smuggling obviously should be dealt with as effectively as possible, but it seems to us that 
the most efficient use of resources in realm of cigarette smoking lies in campaigns to 
convince people that it is not in their best interests to begin or to continue ingesting 
tobacco.  
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